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Abstract— With the dawn of a new era, digital security has 
become one of the most essential part of any network. Be it a 
physical network, virtual network or social network, the 
demand for secure data transmission is ever increasing. 
Wireless mesh networks also stand the same test of security as 
the legacy networks. This paper presents a secure version of 
the Geo-Location Oriented Routing (GLOR) protocol for 
wireless mesh networks, incorporating a multilevel security 
framework. It implements authentication using the new 
features of the network model and enables encryption 
throughout the network to provide high levels of security. 
Keywords—Geo-Location Oriented Routing (GLOR), Smart 
Device Network, Secure-GLOR, Secure Mesh Networks. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the world progresses to new technologies, we 
become more reliant on our technical advancements to 
handle our day to day data. This dependency is now raising 
concerns about the security of the millions of bytes of data 
being transmitted all over the world every day. 
The continuously rising need for security is now 
expanding to every type of network, be it social or physical. 
This need for security has also come to wireless mesh 
networks that have been in development over the past 
years. The mesh networks are known for their ability to 
form self-sustained and easily configurable network by 
connecting large number of devices together, however 
guaranteeing security in such network is one of the major 
issues for future application specific deployments. 
Unlike the legacy networks, the mesh networks depend 
on its devices to relay the data by sending it through a chain 
of devices, the data is accessed by more than just the device 
it was destined for. Hence a need for securely delivery of 
data is very critical to the future of such network model [6]. 
This paper presents the secure version of the GLOR 
protocol, as proposed in the previous paper [8]. Section II 
of this paper begins with a discussion about related 
approaches/models and how they implement security. 
Section III briefly presents the GLOR protocol and its 
various features and how it stands apart from other 
protocols. The security model and its various aspects 
implemented by the GLOR protocol is then explained in 
Section IV followed by a theoretical analysis of the model 
in Section V. Section VI presents the performance of the 
network model under different scenarios with various 
configurations and discusses the results obtained. Finally, 
Section VII concludes with the final thoughts on the next 
step of GLOR protocol. 
II. RELATED WORKS
Amongst the models/approaches that propose a totally 
dynamic self-sustained wireless mesh networks, very few 
take in account the security of data being transmitted. 
The Smart Phone Ad hoc Networks (SPAN) project [1] 
was the earliest practical implementation showing an off-
grid network; however, the project had no current security 
implementation. Though it discusses the use of public-
private key pair for encrypted communication between 
devices, the key exchange process was manual and a major 
risk. 
Several Project [3] and FireChat [4] are other similar 
implementations which use Wi-Fi/Bluetooth to create a 
self-sustained network. However, the methodology lacks 
security as each message is sent to every device on the 
network without any encryption, like a chat room.  
The BRIAR Project [5] has been designed to provide 
secure and resilient peer to peer communications with no 
centralized servers and minimal reliance on external 
infrastructure. The approach implements high levels of 
security using end-to-end encryption to prevent keyword 
filtering. However, to implement high levels of security, 
the devices don't communicate directly unless their owners 
have common contacts. In other words, device ‘A’ can 
communicate with a device ‘C’ through another device ‘B’ 
only if the device ‘A’ and device ‘C’ exist as contacts on 
device ‘B’. This makes it difficult for the network to 
expand or improve functionality. 
There are several security threats are there in wireless 
communication networks, the layer wise classification of 
the security threats and solutions are given in [17][18]. In 
[13][14], it is already proved that symmetric key solutions 
are thousand times faster than a symmetric key solution. 
Symmetric key cryptography is always suitable for the low 
power devices, where shared key need to be updated after 
certain period of time [13][14][15]. Current research trend 
creates hybrid architecture by combining communication 
and computing technologies such as fog or cloud 
computing. In [16][19][20], authors have given the novel 
security solutions for these hybrid architectures. 
Cheikhrouhou et al. [21] have proposed an authentication 
architecture for wireless mesh networks, which also 
designed to maintain data confidentiality. By following 
above specified security solutions, we have applied both 
symmetric key cryptography and asymmetric key 
cryptography for our proposed GLOR protocol. 
III. GEO-LOCATION ORIENTED ROUTING (GLOR) 
Geo Location Oriented Routing (GLOR) [7] is a hybrid 
routing protocol designed to support large, dense & 
dynamic networks without compromising the reliability 
and security of the network and the devices in it. The 
protocol is specifically designed for the high-performance 
devices such as smartphones, tablets, laptops, etc. which 
possess a high processing power and a means to 
communicate with other devices. Following is an outline of 
the major features of the GLOR protocol. 
1) Reverse Network Model:  
The devices (referred to as nodes) are responsible for 
maintaining the network. Tasks include node address 
calculation, node registration, node monitoring, packet 
routing, address allocation etc. are monitored by the nodes.  
2) New Addressing Scheme: 
The smart approach uses geo-location of a device as its 
IP address (described in Section III A). The geo-location is 
obtained using GPS or is calculated by nearby nodes. This 
provides us to determine the instantaneous position of each 
node, like dots on a fixed canvas. 
3) Smart Packets:  
The new data packet has been modified to take 
advantage of the new addressing scheme. The packets are 
supplied with the destination node’s address and can 
dynamically decide its own path (described in Section III 
B). 
4) Security Model:  
The network model also implements authentication and 
encryption to improve the security of the network. The 
Model is further explained in Section IV. 
 
A basic scenario of the protocol components and its 
working is defined in Fig. 1. The various components are 
defined in Table 1. 
 
FIG. 1. DIFFERENT STEPS OF ROUTING PROCESS 
 
TABLE 1. COMPONENTS OF GLOR PROTOCOL. 
Component Definition 
Node 
An electronic device (e.g. Smart-Phone, 
Laptop, and Tablet) that implements 




A node which has the capability to 
connect to other devices wirelessly and 
implements GLOR protocol. 
Web Node 
A Normal Node with the capability to 
connect directly to the Web Register. 
Neighbor 
Node 
A node X is said to be the neighbor node 
of Y if there exists a link between the 
node X and node Y. 
Node 
Location 
It is the Geo-Location of the Node, i.e. 
its latitude and longitude up to 4 decimal 
places and the node’s Unique ID 
Unique ID 
The Unique ID of the node is a onetime 
generated Unique Identification number 
assigned to the Node alongside its MAC 




A cloud-based database dedicated for 
storing vital information about nodes, 
including their MAC address, unique ID, 
address, and current state. 
Sector 
The Sector for a Node can be defined as 
a group of its neighboring nodes. This 
helps improve the accuracy as each node 
in a sector knows other nodes in that 
sector.  
A. Node Addressing 
GLOR protocol uses Geo Location as the IP address for 
the nodes. It is achieved by using the IPv6 addressing 
format that uses 32 hexadecimal bits. These are divided 
into eight groups of 4 hexadecimal bits each 
The first 2 group store the Latitude with the first bit 
representing ‘+’ (as 0) or ‘-’ (as 1), similarly the next 2 
group store the Longitude as shown in Fig. 2. Each bit 
represents 10n meters, where n is the position of the bit 
(starting from right to left).   
FIG. 2. ADDRESSING SCHEME (PART 1) 
The next 4 groups store the cluster number and the 
sector number. Each sector represents 100 square meters of 
land and is defined using the Latitude-Longitude system. 
The cluster is a combination of predefined sectors. Fig. 3 
explains the Sector-Cluster structure used. 
FIG. 3. ADDRESSING SCHEME (PART 2) 
The Sectors and Clusters are calculated automatically 
based on the Latitude and Longitude of the node, which is 
based on International Standard representation of 
geographic point location by coordinates. 
B. Smart Packets 
GLOR uses a modified version of the basic data packet 
as shown in Fig. 4. It’s designed to be simple yet contain 
enough information that it can calculate its own path. 
FIG. 4. PACKET FORMAT (OMITTING TCP/IP HEADERS) 
The simple design and minimized header size helps the 
packets carry more data and reduce overhead. Various 
components of the packet are described below. 
• Packet Length - It is the length of the packet (in bytes).  
• Packet ID - The Packet ID or PID must be incremented 
by one each time a new GLOR packet is transmitted 
• Message Type - It indicates the type of the message that 
is being transmitted.  
• Hop Count - It is the number of hops a message has 
attained. It is incremented every time the packet is 
retransmitted. 
• Validity Time - It is the maximum time during which 
the information of the packet is considered valid. If a 
node receives a packet with Validity Time = 0, the 
packet is discarded. 
• Origin Node ID - This is the ID of the node that 
originally generated the packet. It is not to be confused 
with the Source Node ID in the IP header as it is updated 
each time to the address on the intermediate node. 
• Message Size - It is the total size in bytes measured 
from the beginning of “Message Type” till the end of 
the message. 
• Message ID - A unique ID is provided to each message 
by the Origin Node. It is incremented by one for each 
message. 
• Origin Node Public Key – It is the public key of the 
origin node that is to be used by the destination node for 
encrypting any data it wishes to send back. 
• Message – It is the actual data being sent to the 
destination node. 
C. Web Register 
As referred to in Table 1, the web register is a cloud 
based dedicated database used to store device information. 
It can be accessed by any authenticated node that has access 
to the internet, or through a neighbor node which possesses 
internet access. The web register acts as the yellow pages 
of the network and improves the performance and accuracy 
of the network. 
Web register, being a key element of the network, is not 
a central or control node. The network can function without 
its presence by following a Sector-Broadcast Progression. 
According to this method, the origin node sends out packets 
aimed in the direction of its four neighboring sectors. As 
each node keeps a record of all the devices in their sector, 
it can check if the destination node exists in the sector. If 
yes then the packet is relayed to it, if not then the packet is 
forwarded to the neighboring sector. In comparison to 
simple broadcast method, the sector-broadcast helps lower 
the load on the network. 
D. Packet Creation 
Before the origin node can send a packet, it requests the 
web register for details about the destination node by 
providing the destination node’s unique ID. The web 
register checks for the details associated with the unique ID 
and responds accordingly. 
Once the web register locates the details, it also checks 
if the destination node is still connected to the network. 
When the verification is complete, the details are then sent 
to the origin node and are used to create the smart packet. 
Please refer to [7], for more details about the packet 
processing and forwarding. 
IV. SECURITY MODEL 
The GLOR protocol implements a very basic but 
effective security model [8]. It is implemented through 
different network levels, and each level focuses on an 
important aspect of routing. The two aspects are 
authentication and encryption and are explained below in 
detail. 
A. Authentication 
It is the first step of security, a request to connect to the 
network and initiates the node registration process as 
shown in Fig. 5. The authenticated devices in the network 
collect information from a device that wishes to connect to 
the network. This data is first analysed by the authenticated 
node itself, compared with the data collected by its 
neighbour nodes from the device and then sent to the web 
register for further analysis. 
The web register checks its database to find any records 
matching with the device information. If a record is found, 
it is compared to the device data in order to spot any spam 
nodes. Once the device is verified, it is given the 
‘authenticated node’ status and all data to and from the 
device is hereafter encrypted until it disconnects from the 
network. 
If the web register does not contain any records 
matching the device, it is considered to be a new device. In 
such case, the new device is requested to follow a one-time 
manual registration process that includes providing device 
details, selecting a unique ID and generating a Public-
Private key to be used for encryption. The details (except 
the private key) are then sent to the web register and 
converted into a record and the new device is given the 
‘authenticated node’ status and all data to and from the 
device is hereafter encrypted until it disconnects from the 
network. 
Another important part of authentication is the 
monitoring of the network conducted by the web register. 
As it receives constant updates from nodes in the network 
including the change in geo-location, it can easily spot 
discrepancies in the data. For instance, if a device is trying 
to impersonate a node on the network, the web register 
would receive two sets of updates for the same device 
showing inconsistent data and hence flag the suspicion for 
further analysis. 
It can also help identify lost or stolen devices once they 
try to reconnect to the network. The device data will be 
used to identify the node and its geo location can be used 
to recover it. 
B. Encryption 
Securing the data being transmitted through the nodes 
is another major factor for the integrity of network model. 
This is achieved by using asymmetric encryption 
throughout the network. As mentioned earlier, once a node 
has been authenticated all the data to and from the node is 
encrypted.  
The encryption technique used is RSA to encrypt the 
message part of the smart packet. It begins during the 
packet formation process after the origin node requests for 
the details of the destination node. Each node generates a 
new public-private key pair during its first registration 
during which it also sends a copy of the public key to the 
web register. This comes in handy when a node wishes to 
send some data.  
 
Algorithm 1. Key Management  
KPR(i) – private key of node i 
KPU(i) – public key of node i  
WR - web register; SN - sender node; DN - destination 
node 
1. At initial node registration  ∀ node i generates its key pair i.e. KPR(i) and KPU(i) 
2. Nodes share own public key with web register 
(WR) 
KPU(i) → WR 
3. During data transmission 
SN (request) → WR (DN location) 
If WR authenticate SN and found DN in the register 
WR → SN: (KPU(DN) ∥ Loc (DN))  
Then SN uses KPU(DN) for data encryption. 
 
FIG. 5. NODE REGISTRATION PROCESS. 
 
As explained in Section III(D), once the node receives 
information about the destination node, it also receives the 
public key of the destination node. This is used to encrypt 
the message part of the packet such that only the destination 
node can decrypt it using its own private key. In addition to 
encrypting the message, the node also provides its own 
public key that the destination node can use to encrypt any 
response it wishes to send. The complete procedure for key 
management in Secure-GLOR is shown in Algorithm 1.  
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
This section provides a theoretical analysis of our 
proposed Secure-GLOR model to show the working model 
with potential security threats and how Secure-GLOR is 
protected against them. We use asymmetric key 
cryptography to protect data in dynamic mesh network. The 
proposed security method performs efficiently without 
degrading network performance.  
We have made a practical and realistic assumption in 
our method, as described below. 
Assumption 1. In our method, the data that is encrypted 
by an asymmetric-key method cannot be decrypted by any 
other, unless they have the private key.  
A. Security proofs  
Definition 1 (attack on integrity): A malicious attacker 
Mi can attack the integrity if it is an adversary capable of 
monitoring the data packets regularly and trying to access 
and modify them before they reach their destination.  
Definition 2 (attack on confidentiality): A malicious 
attacker Mc is an unauthorized party which has ability to 
access or view the unauthorized data packets before they 
reach the destination node. 
 
Theorem 1: Proposed Secure-GLOR maintain end-to-end 
security in mesh network with dynamic nodes.  
Proof: We used an asymmetric key cryptographic method 
to maintain end-to-end security over our GLOR protocol in 
dynamic wireless mess network. Our network model uses 
high end resource devices (i.e. smartphones, laptop, etc.), 
so we prefer to reduce number of keys in use and hence, 
reduce the network overhead.   
In symmetric key cryptography with n number of 
nodes, the number of pairwise keys calculated for secure 
communication is as below: If a new node i is added to the network, it needs to share 
a new key with other nodes. 
 
Then for n users, we have 1 + 2 + ⋯ + − 1 =  
keys. ⇒ there will be  keys. 
In a similar way, for asymmetric key cryptography with 
n number of nodes, the number of pairwise keys calculated 
for secure communication are as below: If a new node i is added to the network, it needs only a 
public key and a private key to share a new key with other 
nodes. 
 
Then for n users, we have 2  keys.  ⇒ there will be  keys. 
While comparing with other existing symmetric key 
algorithms, individual nodes may need separate pair, so in 
result we have 4n keys i.e.  keys. 
Another advantage with asymmetric key over 
symmetric key algorithm is that it does not require 
changing or updating the key after a certain interval of time, 
which leads to reduced network communication overhead 
and loss of secret keys. Our security method use public key 
(KPU) to encrypt and private key (KPR) to decrypt the data 
packets, and each node only shares its public key with web 
register. Hence, an intruder can reach at web register to 
obtain the public key but it’s impossible to get the private 
key as the node never shares it with anyone. 
Finally, only recipient node can decrypt data packet 
using own private key (KPR). Therefore, we can conclude 
that Secure-GLOR maintains end-to-end security. 
 
Theorem 2: Secure-GLOR is secure against attack on 
integrity and confidentiality  
Proof: Following Algorithm 1, it is clear that the intruder 
cannot get the destination node’s private key to decrypt the 
data packet. 
Following Definition 1, we know that an attacker Mi has 
full access to the network to read data flow, but Mi cannot 
get private key information of destination node such as KPR. 
Intruder can get the public key KPU but it’s useless as there 
is no such method to obtain/derive the private key using 
public key. In the same way following Definition 2, Mc can 
gain access to the public key KPU but no other information.  
Finally, Mi and Mc can neither read nor modify the data 
packets, it can only be accessed by the destination node. 
Hence, Secure-GLOR is secure against an attack on 
integrity and confidentiality.  
B. Forward secrecy  
By following a standard asymmetric key cryptography 
procedures, destination node’s public key is used to encrypt 
the data packets, which can only be decrypted using 
destination node’s private key. Even if the public key is 
known to intruders, it cannot be used to decrypt the packet. 
We choose to use asymmetric key cryptography over 
symmetric key cryptography because network nodes have 
enough resources, battery and computational power to 
compute complex encryption/decryption. This introduces 
technical challenges for the intruder to break the encrypted 
data packets. This also avoids repeated rekeying process 
and reduce communication overhead.  
Proposed Secure-GLOR method is secured against any 
kind of malicious attack as we use different keys for 
encryption and decryption process. Finally, we conclude 
that intruder cannot predict the keys to read the data 
packets. 
VI. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
As discussed in the previous paper [7] the GLOR 
protocol has been developed in Visual Studio using C#. 
The machine used for simulation is powered by a 6th Gen. 
Intel i7 (3.1 GHz) CPU and 16GB DDR3L RAM running 
Windows 10. 
A. Environment Setup 
The environment consists of nodes evenly spread on a 
2D plane. The nodes location is calculated using the X-Y 
coordinate of the device on the 2D plane. The web register 
is implemented using a local database. The nodes have 
been allocated random transmission speeds varying from 
11Mbps to 25Mbps based on which the transmission time 
is calculated.  
The test-bed includes the following assumptions 
• The nodes have already been authenticated and have a 
unique id. 
• None of the nodes fail during the operation. 
• All nodes have the capability to calculate their location. 
• No packet is dropped during the transmission process. 
• Each node has a direct/indirect connection to the web 
register. 
B. Simulation and Observation 
The simulation initiates with the nodes calculating their 
geo location (using their X-Y coordinates) and generate a 
Public-Private Key pair for encryption. The nodes send 
their location and public key to the web register and start 
connecting to the neighbor nodes to create the neighbor 
table to improve network performance. 
The nodes use a predefined data-set to be 
communicated between the source and destination nodes. 
There are 72 nodes being used in this setup and information 
like transmission time, CPU utilization, and memory 
utilization is calculated and compared with various 
encryption schemes. This provides us with valuable 
information about how the network performs under 
different scenarios. 
C. Results and Analysis 
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, give us a network performance insight 
in respect to the time taken for a data packet to be created, 
sent to the destination and receive an acknowledgement for 
the same. It also shows us the amount of delay obtained in 
proportion to the distance travelled. 
 
FIG. 6. TIME TAKEN FOR TRIP (500-BYTES DATA) 
The comparison consists of both symmetric encryption 
(AES 128, AES 256) and asymmetric encryption (RSA 
2048, RSA 4096). In the first scenario, a data-set of 500 
Bytes is encrypted and sent from the origin node to the 
destination node. From Fig. 6, it is observed that there is 
steady increase in the time taken for the packet to reach its 
destination and it is directly proportional to the distance 
travelled (number of hops). 
The graph also shows that there is very little difference 
in the time taken by AES 128 and RSA 2014, however AES 
256 and RSA 4096 take a comparatively longer time due to 
the increased size of encrypted data. This implies that the 
network is able to perform normally even after encryption 




FIG. 7. TIME TAKEN FOR TRIP (64000-BYTES DATA) 
In the second scenario, a data-set of 64000 Bytes is used 
to test the simulation. The results, as shown in Fig. 7, depict 
that the symmetric encryption has a similar steady increase 
comparable to scenario one. However, the asymmetric 
encryption has a very large increase (almost 2 seconds for 
RSA 2048 and 8 seconds for RSA 4069).  
The major factor for such a high increase can be directly 
related to the key size for RSA encryption, which requires 
the data to be broken down into small chunks and then 
encrypted individually. This leads to a longer wait cycle 
during encryption and decryption process (at the origin and 
destination node). 
 
FIG. 8. MEMORY CONSUMPTION. 
The performance analysis of each encryption technique 
based on resource consumption was also carried out in the 
above-mentioned scenario one and two. As Fig. 8 and Fig. 
9 show us, the symmetric encryption techniques had similar 
memory consumption of about 4 Megabytes, however AES 
256 had almost double CPU usage of 24 % as compared to 
AES 128 which only required 14%. Hence it can be 
deduced that even though the time required for both 
techniques is almost identical, the resource requirement for 
AES 256 is much more. 
The asymmetric encryption techniques RSA 2048 and 
RSA 4096 had similar memory consumption (4.8 
Megabytes) and CPU usage (27%-28%). Hence both 
techniques require almost the same amount of resources but 
their time consumption is directly proportional to the 
amount of data. However, overall the symmetric 
encryption had less resource consumption when compared 
to asymmetric encryption. 
 
 
FIG. 9. CPU USAGE. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The future challenge consists of finding ways to 
decrease the time taken in encryption and decryption 
process without increasing the resource requirement. One 
of the ways this can be achieved is by using hybrid 
encryption techniques that merges the best of both 
symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques.  
The results from the simulation provide a very vivid 
profile of all the encryption techniques that have been 
compared. It can be deduced that both symmetric and 
asymmetric encryption technique have similar 
performance results with a small data set however if the 
size of the data set is increased, the asymmetric encryption 
techniques require a lot more time and resources to perform 
the task. 
Even so, the asymmetric encryption technique is more 
suitable to the GLOR protocol as the network model can 
provide more security by using public-private keys unique 
to each device as compared to a universal key for 
symmetric encryption. 
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